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Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, had a flexible approach to international law. 
On the one hand, he strongly relied on the principles of the 
un Charter and general international law, on the other, he 
used a flexible and balanced ad hoc technique, taking into ac-
count values and policy factors whenever possible, to resolve 
concrete problems. Hammarskjöld had a tendency to express 
basic principles in terms of opposing tendencies, to apply a 
discourse of polarity or dualism, stressing for example that the 
observance of human rights was balanced by the concept of 
non–intervention, or the concept of intervention by national 
sovereignty, and recognizing that principles and precepts could 
not provide automatic answers in concrete cases. Rather, such 
norms would serve «as criteria which had to be weighed and 
balanced in order to achieve a rational solution of the par-
ticular problem»1. Very often it worked.
* Professor emeritus of Stockholm University and the Swedish Na-
tional Defense College. Exposición realizada en el Instituto de Es-
tudios Internacionales el 26 de octubre de 2011.
1 Oscar Schachter, »Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to 
Politics», 56 American Journal of International Law (ajil) 1962, pp. 
2-5. Quotation from p. 5. Hammarskjöld recognized that there was 
a tension between principles and concrete needs; by taking account 
of both, he sought to achieve (in his own words) «that combination 
of steadfastness of purpose and flexibility of approach which alone 
can guarantee that the possibilities which we are exploring will have 
been tested to the full». Ibid.
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Dag Hammarskjöld has gone to history as an inspiring 
international personality, injecting a dose of moral leader-
ship and personal integrity into a world of power politics. 
He succeeded Trygve Lie as Secretary-General in April 1953, 
in the midst of the Cold War, and in addition to East-West 
rivalry he was confronted with Third World problems and the 
agonizing birth of the new Republic of Congo, a tumultuous 
crisis through which he lost his life in the Ndola air crash in 
September 1961.
Intellectual background and personal 
philosophy
Dag Hammarskjöld was born in 1905 in a small town in 
middle Sweden where his father at the time was President of 
the District Court of Appeal. His father, Hjalmar Hammar-
skjöld, was later, between 1914 and 1917, Prime Minister of 
Sweden. Dag´s elder brother Åke became in 1920 a member 
of the League of Nations secretariat. Between 1922 and 1936 
Åke was Registrar of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Hague. At the time of his premature death, in 
1937, Åke was appointed to serve as a Judge in the Hague 
Court. The father and his sons were groomed in a typical 
Swedish civil service tradition where the concepts of «duty» 
and «responsibility» reflected time-honored values. It has been 
said of Dag Hammarskjöld that he had a manifest pride in 
his family´s legal background and that he «regarded himself 
as a man of law».2 Nevertheless, he was a professional econo-
mist. Although he studied law at Uppsala University he later 
produced a doctoral thesis in economics.
Dag had a very close relationship to his mother Agnes, 
a religious and pious woman, and from her he inherited a 
simple wish to «do good» in concrete cases. Already as a 
young man he was interested in medieval religious thinking. 
His early correspondence includes references to mystics like 
Meister Echart (d. 1327) and Thomas a Kempis (d. 1471). He 
had received Thomas a Kempis´De imitatione Christi from his 
2 Gustaf Aulén, Dag Hammarskjöld´s White Book, An Analys of 
Markings, Fortress Press/Gleerup, Philadelphia 1969, p. 14.
161
• D O C U M E N T O S •
mother Agnes in 1921 and kept the book for the rest of his life. 
Later he also referred to Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), the more 
empiric and realist philosopher who tried to combine Christian 
doctrine with Aristotelian thinking, and St. John of the Cross 
(d. 1591), who combined Christian mysticism with religious 
reformism and poetry. What these thinkers had in common 
was a focus on meditation and seclusion, a stress on the impor-
tance of a man´s inner life in relation to God in preparation for 
individual choices and individual action. Hammarskjöld was 
through his life attracted to this personal approach to moral 
decision-making. It also connected to then societal values of 
«duty, righteousness and self-service»conveyed by his father 
and pious-moral influence exerted by his mother.3
Hammarskjöld also had an intense relationship to world 
literature. He used the works of Joseph Conrad, Herman 
Hesse, Fjodor Dostojevskij and others for personal reflec-
tion in situations where decisions needed to be taken. It was 
manifest from his correspondence and diary that these and 
other authors played a significant role in his world of ideas. 
Dostojevskij´s The Brothers Karamazov includes references to 
each individual´s universal responsibility for other individuals, 
to the ideas of «service to mankind» and «brotherhood and 
inclusiveness of men», and to individual action «for the sake 
of future». Hammarskjöld was much attracted to the idea of 
moral individual action. He also felt that Joseph Conrad´s 
book Lord Jim and Herman Melville´s Moby Dick caught 
the dilemmas of strong-willed individuals who pursued their 
chosen path of life in constant uphill battles.
Hammarskjöld was not afraid of uphill battles. He saw 
the appointment as Secretary-General to the un as a chal-
lenge and a chance to be of real service to the international 
community. He was much influenced by the ethics of Albert 
Schweitzer and his emphasis on the sanctity of human life. 
At last Hammarskjöld was himself in a position to put into 
action the ideal of service to man.
3 «An International Administrative Service», from an address to the 
International Law Association at McGill University, Montreal, 30 
May, 1956. See Wilder Foote (Ed.), The Servant of Peace, A Selection 
of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld (hereinafter 
referred to as Speeches), The Bodley Head, London 1962, p. 116.
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In the United Nations
Already some time after Hammarskjöld´s appointment as 
Secretary-General in 1953 it became clear that he had an in-
novative approach to the possibilities of the United Nations. 
He was not a formalist, he wanted to go forward and act in 
line with the purposes of the un Charter. The purposes of the 
Charter were fixed and binding, but the working methods of 
the Organization must be flexible and innovative. He did not 
want to feel fettered by concrete provisions of the Charter that 
did not explicitly provide for things he wanted to do, options 
he wanted to test in his capacity as Secretary-General. If he felt 
that the purposes of the un made it possible, he would envision 
a mandate flowing from the Charter to act in accordance with 
his conscience as an international civil servant. 
Hammarskjöld set out his views on the role of the un Or-
ganization and his approach to the un Charter in the Annual 
reports to the General Assembly. In this context he developed 
a doctrine on the independence of the international civil serv-
ant, including an active role for the Secretary-General under 
an expansive interpretation of Articles 97-100 of the Charter. 
He introduced new mechanisms for a un presence in conflict 
areas, for example the appointment of Special Representatives 
of the Secretary General (srsg:s).
He did not make a very sharp distinction between law and 
politics. He did not look upon international law as mainly 
«written law», but emphasized the whole international pat-
tern of rules and behavior. Already before Wolfgang Friedman 
had published his famous book The Changing Structure of 
International Law (1964) Hammarskjöld used the distinction 
between the traditional «law of coexistence» and the more 
dynamic «law of cooperation». The world, in his view, was 
slowly moving into the latter more advanced area, which 
included supranational decision-making.
During his time as Secretary-General (1953-61) Hammar-
skjöld set forth a number of general themes regarding the role 
of the un, but he did not articulate specific doctrines on human 
rights, intervention or security. Nevertheless, as we shall see, 
he developed new methods for the functioning of the system 
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of collective security, and he was a forerunner in the field of 
what today is called human security. 
One of Hammarskjöld´s first tasks as Secretary-General 
was to negotiate the release of American pilots taken pris-
oners by China in the aftermath of the Korean War. In this 
context he felt the support of the wisdom of the Jewish phi-
losopher Martin Buber as expressed in the book Ich und Du 
(1923). Buber stressed the importance of human dialogue 
and Hammarskjöld´s visit to Beijing in January 1955 was 
marked by fruitful intellectual dialogue with Chinese Premier 
Chou En-lai. The chemistry between the two men made the 
conversation sparkle. Later the same year the US airmen were 
released. The release coincided with Chou En-lai´s personal 
congratulations to the Secretary-General at his 50th birthday. 
Hammarskjöld is famous for having coined the concepts of 
preventive and quite diplomacy, but in this case it was more 
a matter of personal diplomacy.
The introduction of peacekeeping
Hammarskjöld is best known for his innovative approach 
to the un Charter. The first example here is the matter of 
peacekeeping, which was not, and still is not, mentioned in 
the Charter.
Hammarskjöld elaborated the new concept during the 
Suez crisis of 1956. As the Security Council was blocked by 
a joint British and French veto the Secretary-General had to 
rely on the General Assembly. As a procedural matter he used 
the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950 to summon an extra 
Emergency Session of the Assembly. Together with the Cana-
dian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, he thereafter introduced 
the option of a un mandated military peace operation in the 
conflict area, with the consent of the parties to the conflict. On 
7 November, 1956, the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion which launched the first peacekeeping operation in un 
history, the un Emergency Force in the Middle East (unef).
Although un observer missions had been fielded in 1948 
and 1949, the deployment of armed troops to assist in the 
implementation of agreements reached between the un and 
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parties to a conflict added a new dimension to international 
relations. To govern these operations Hammarskjöld laid 
down three principles: (1) consent from the territorial state 
and other parties involved; (2) impartiality from the un side 
to secure credibility in the operation; and (3) non-use of force 
from the un side, unless in individual self-defense or collective 
mission defense.
Over the years it became clear that the Security Council 
should be the un body to decide on all forms of un peace 
operations, not only with regard to peace enforcement under 
Chapter vii of the Charter, but also with regard to coopera-
tive peacekeeping.
When unef was established Hammarskjöld considered it 
a new departure. «It is», he said, «certainly not contrary to 
the Charter, but is in a certain sense outside the explicit terms 
of the Charter».
Thus peacekeeping operations, pkos, were not foreseen 
under either Chapter vi or vii of the Charter, they fell some-
where in between, and not surprisingly the unwritten Chapter 
VI½ has been suggested as their legal basis. It is submitted that 
this «VI½ perception» is appropriate and useful; appropriate 
because pkos are a more ambitious involvement than anything 
provided for in Chapter VI; and politically useful because it 
shows that innovations, even without textual support, can be 
legitimized under the system of the Charter if they fulfill the 
purposes of the un Organization.
Hammarskjöld´s dynamic approach to the 
law of the un
Dag Hammarskjöld was appointed Secretary-General five 
years after Hans Morgenthau had published his influential 
realist opus Politics among Nations. In a speech in 1956 
Hammarskjöld had reason to comment on the divide between 
idealism and realism. Assertions that the un had failed were 
often misleading, he said:
Do we refer to the purposes of the Charter? They are expres-
sions of universally shared ideals which cannot fail us, though 
we, alas, often fail them. Or do we think of the institutions of 
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the United Nations? They are our tools. We fashioned them. We 
use them. It is our responsibility to remedy any flaws there may 
be in them.
And he continued:
This is a difficult lesson for both idealists and realists, though 
for different reasons. I suppose that, just as the first temptation 
of the realist is the illusion of cynicism, so the first temptation 
of the idealist is the illusion of Utopia.4
Hammarskjöld was an idealist in the sense that he believed 
in the purposes and principles of the un Charter and in the 
possibilities of the un Organization. At the same time, he 
was a realist in the sense that he did not want to stretch the 
potential capacities of the Organization too much if member 
states were not ready for it. For example, he opposed the 
idea of a standing un military force, because he felt it was 
politically premature in view of the strong feelings related to 
national sovereignty, and also because he felt it was unpracti-
cal to have a ready-made military unit standing by, when it 
was much better to tailor a unit to the specific demands of an 
upcoming situation.5
It goes without saying that he wanted the un to respond 
to the demands of the international community, and in re-
flecting how that should be done he fell back on a distinction 
between existing legal norms and innovative procedures. On 
the one hand, he could refer to the un normative framework 
in a natural law oriented manner that included an implicit 
element of staticism. Thus, in 1956 he stated that 
the principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than the 
Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which 
they are to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single 
nation or people.6
4 Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, The Bodley Head, London/Sydney/
Toronto 1973, p. 230.
5 Statement during the Suez Crisis, October 31, 1956. Official Records 
of the Security Council, 751st meeting. Quoted in Urquhart (1973), 
p. 174.
6 From the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral on the Activities of the Organization 1958-59, 22 August, 1959. 
Speeches (1962), p. 223.
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On the other hand, he often used a dynamic and evolu-
tionary approach to the system of the un Charter, arguing for 
example that although the objectives and rules of the Charter 
were binding, the working methods of the system could be 
supplemented by new procedures:
As is well known, such an evolution has in fact taken place, 
and it has . . . been recognized that . . . new procedures may be 
developed when they prove productive in practice for . . . the 
objectives of the Charter. In this respect, the United Nations, 
as a living organism, has the necessary scope for a continuous 
adaptation of its . . . [system] to the needs [of the international 
community].7
This organic approach was in line with his views on the 
Uniting for Peace resolution and the establishment of unef. 
But Hammarskjöld developed it further into a dynamic con-
ception of the un Organization. His successor, U Thant, once 
remarked that Hammarskjöld was prone to use his great gift 
for innovation and improvisation. He «discovered new ways 
to help keep the peace» – an emergency force in one situa-
tion, an observer group in another, and a un presence in a 
third context.8
The dynamic approach of Hammarskjöld was also stressed 
by his collaborator in the un Secretariat, Ralph Bunche. 
Bunche indicated in a speech in 1964 that Hammarskjöld 
consciously strove to make the un a progressive force for 
human advancement. Wherever there was a conflict situation, 
actual or threatening, he believed the un should actively seek 
to contain or avert it:
[B]y quiet diplomacy when the circumstances permitted, in 
the form of good offices if the parties themselves demonstrated 
an inability to deal with the situation; and, if necessary by overt 
United Nations action.
Bunch added that Hammarskjöld saw clearly that the 
un «must do more than hold meetings and talk and adopt 
7 U Thant, «Looking ahead», Address given at Columbia University, 
January 7, 1964. See Andrew N. Cordier and Wilder Foote (Eds.), 
The Quest for Peace, The Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lectures, 
Columbia University Press, New York & London 1965, p. 40.
8 Quotation by Lester B. Pearson in Cordier & Foote (1965), p. 100.
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resolutions».9 Hammarskjöld said himself at a press confer-
ence, early in 1959, that the un simply must respond to those 
demands which may be put to it. If those demands would go 
beyond the «present capacity», that must not, in itself, be a 
reason to exclude action. The capacity of the un could prove 
to be bigger than expected. He referred to the Organization 
as a machine, thrusting its way through the terrain of inter-
national politics. He said:
I do not know the exact capacity of this machine. It did take 
the very steep hill of Suez; it may take other and even steeper 
hills.10
Hammarskjöld was not confronted with the issues of hu-
man security and un intervention until the summer of 1960, 
but he had reason to comment upon some of the elements of 
that discourse before that. With regard to the protection of 
national sovereignty he referred in a speech in 1953 to the 
classical Chinese philosopher and poet Tao-Tse Tung, who is 
reported as stating that whoever wants to grip the world and 
shape it will fail, because the world is a spiritual thing that 
cannot be shaped. Hammarskjöld later in his speech made 
clear that the United Nations
has no power to encroach upon the national sovereignty 
of any state against the will of its government and people. It 
would indeed not only be against the letter and the spirit of the 
Charter . . . to attempt to impose its will in domestic matters. 
It would also be against the elementary wisdom expressed . . . 
[by] Tao-Tse Tung.11
With regard to the protection of human rights Hammar-
skjöld said at one point that behind the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights «we find literally thousands of people who 
directly or indirectly participated actively in its drafting».12 He 
thereby implied that the Declaration was not mainly a con-
tribution of the West. He further stated that the Declaration 
9 Speeches, Wilder Foote (1962), p. 43.
10 «The Uses of Private Diplomacy», Address in the Houses of Parlia-
ment, London, 2 April 1958. Speeches (1962), p. 174.
11 Unpublished statement quoted by Brian Urquhart in Hammarskjold 
(1973), p. 438.
12 Ibid., p. 438.
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could be called a «universal expression» on the subject in a 
world where the memory was still fresh of some of the worst 
infringements of human rights ever experienced in history.
With regard to the principle of collective security Ham-
marskjöld sometimes referred to the Chapter vii procedure as 
a necessary requirement for armed action. At the same time 
he was prone to relate the matter of collective peacemaking to 
the other objectives of the Charter. Not surprisingly, he then 
used a contextual approach. In his view, peace was not solid 
without human rights, and human rights could not be fully 
realized unless peace was at hand.13
In a similar tenor he also saw the creation of the un as 
something going beyond the exclusive interests of states and 
governments. In 1968 he made the point that a global co-
operative project was not a new idea. The un Organization 
was a body for collective efforts established after centuries of 
human struggle. He said:
It is the logical and natural development from lines of thought 
and aspiration going far back into all corners of the earth since 
a few men first began to think about the decency and dignity 
of other men.14
The choice of emphasis on «men» instead of «states», and 
on «dignity» instead of security, is perhaps telling for how 
Hammarskjöld regarded the objectives of the un Charter. 
Collective security included human dignity. Or, as we would 
express it today, collective security is not only state security 
but also human security. The interests of the international 
society of states could and should not differ from the interests 
of mankind.
The issue of un humanitarian intervention 
in peace operations
When the political situation in the Republic of Congo dete-
riorated in the summer of 1960 a un peace operation was 
13 Security Council Official Records, 896th Meeting, 9 September 1960, 
para 101.
14 «The Uses of Private Diplomacy», Address in the Houses of Parlia-
ment, London, 2 April 1958. Speeches (1962), p. 174.
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launched, onuc. In August there were tribal massacres in 
the province of Kasai. Hundreds of Balubas were killed by 
Government soldiers. Villages had been pillaged and burned 
and their inhabitants, including children, killed simply for the 
reason of their ethnicity.
Hammarskjöld felt –and made clear to his associates– that 
the un could not stand aside and remain passive in what he 
called «a case of incipient genocide». He indicated that the 
Central Government had to accept this responsibility of the un.
True, the Kasai situation was a delicate one for the UN to 
interfere in, against the background of an unclear mandate and 
the non-intervention principle of Article 2(7) of the Charter. 
But, on the other hand, Hammarskjöld concluded in a cable 
to his emissary in Leopoldville:
Prohibition against intervention in internal conflicts cannot be 
considered to apply to senseless slaughter of civilians or fighting 
arising from tribal hostilities.15
After a meeting with his advisers in New York, he author-
ized the interposing of un troops, using force if necessary, 
to stop the massacres.16 As it happened, in the beginning of 
September 1960, the situation calmed down and there was 
no need to act upon these instructions.
In reporting to the Security Council on 9 September Ham-
marskjöld referred to the atrocities as international crimes. 
He stated:
They involve a most flagrant violation of elementary human 
rights and have the characteristics of the crime of genocide since 
they appear to be directed towards the extermination of a specific 
ethnic group, the Balubas.17
Hammarskjöld did not at this point ask for an extended 
onuc mandate to deal with the humanitarian threats. His 
moral gut reaction was –as is shown by the cable to Leopol-
dville– that it was not necessary. But diplomatic prudence 
would of course have it that any humanitarian crossing of 
15 Unpublished statement quoted by Brian Urquhart in Hammarskjold 
(1973), p. 438.
16 Ibid., p. 438.
17 Security Council Official Records, 896th Meeting, 9 September 1960, 
para 101.
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the borderline between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
should be mandated by the Security Council, and if there is 
no time for that, that Council approval should at least be 
registered ex post facto.
Hammarskjöld´s position in principle was clear. We can 
assume that it was not exclusively a legal position. His moral 
«do good» inclination was probably influenced by his Chris-
tian values and he was not prepared to compromise with his 
personal conviction. In his report to the General Assembly 
he made clear:
You try to save a drowning man without prior authorization.18
There was probably also a policy element of human 
rights involved. Hammarskjöld was normally not a driving 
force in the field of human rights. The issue was tainted with 
Cold War controversy and he regularly approached it with 
caution. In this case, however, he was prepared to use the 
Secretary-General´s power of interpretation to protect human 
rights and play the card of «incipient genocide» to increase 
his power of persuasion. To him, obviously, it was a matter 
of values and a mix of law and morality. He was not alien 
to the incorporation of extra-legal elements in the process of 
international law. Although he laid heavy emphasis on the 
non-intervention principle of Article 2(7) of the Charter, he 
nevertheless thought that the Kasai massacres were outside the 
scope of that provision. His personal ethics coincided with the 
natural law proposition that lex scripta had to be reconciled 
with a law of higher order.
Hammarskjöld´s policy related instinct, focused on a kind 
of «UN responsibility to protect» perception, did not make 
a significant imprint in the peacekeeping discourse during 
the Cold War. It is noteworthy, though, that the principle of 
protecting civilians during peace operations has been brought 
into the present millennium by the Brahimi report (2000)19 
and through the broader concept of Responsibility to Protect 
18 Statement on un Operations in Congo before the General Assembly, 
17 October 1960.
19 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired 
by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), transmitted to the Sec-
retary-General on 17 August 2000. UN Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809. 
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(2005)20. Hammarskjöld´s instinctive approach to the matter 
has come to stay and is now codified in the peacekeeping 
doctrine of the United Nations.21
Concluding remarks: Leadership and legal 
development
The future of the un Organization lies, as always in the case 
of Inter-Governmental Organizations (igos), in the hands of 
Member States. Political will is essential, as is international 
leadership. Unfortunately, the world today suffers from a 
lack of both. As to political will, Hammarskjöld did not ex-
pect it to surface in multilaterally negotiated documents, he 
saw it develop through precedents created by a responsible 
international leadership. Thus the Hammarskjöld approach 
to the unand international law was not to rely on drawn out 
political compromise, but on ad hoc arrangements respond-
ing to urgent and concrete needs in line with the purposes of 
the un. As Hammarskjöld´s biographer Brian Urquhart has 
pointed out, the then Secretary-General believed that a just and 
reliable world order had to rely on precedents (state practice) 
made possible through political acquiescence. In that sense he 
was a political realist.
Hammarskjöld´s contribution to international law, beyond 
his innovative and flexible use of the un Charter, lies in his em-
phasis on value based collective decision-making in response 
to pressing needs. He realized that a progressive development 
of international law could not exclusively be achieved through 
multilateral treaty-making, but that, in addition, an element 
of development through practice would be needed. However, 
development through precedents presumes that those interna-
tional actors which are prepared to take the lead, statesmen of 
governments and organizations, can inspire confidence in their 
initiatives vis-à-vis the rest of the international community. 
20 General Assembly Resolution 60/1, World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment (2005), paras 138-139.
21 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recom-
mendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 
unDoc. A/60/640 (2005).
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To find and promote such actors of global leadership, sensi-
tive to political feelings and aware of political opportunities, 
with distinct trans-cultural outlooks, will be a challenge for 
nation-states and international organizations alike. Statesmen 
of the caliber of Dag Hammarskjold are hard to find.
Thank you. 
